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Big Question – What caused the high inflation of the 
1970s?  There is much recent research on this question. 
 
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) – Empirical paper finds 
pre-Volker Fed weaker on inflation than Post-Volker 
Fed.  They don’t try to explain why. 
 
Delong (1997) agrees and argues that the 1970s Fed had 
no political mandate for vigorous anti-inflation policy.  If 
the Fed had pursued one it probably would have been 
transformed beyond recognition.  Why no mandate?  The 
Great Depression created a widespread belief that 
potential output was only reached at the top of a business 
cycle.  It took the 1970s to overturn this view.  This is a 
“march of science” view, although it’s possible that we 
will eventually forget the lessons of the 1970s.   
 
Sargent (1999) offers essentially the Delong view as one 
of the two alternatives he considers but comes down in 
favour of a different story: that the Fed’s underlying 
theory never changed but that it adjusted policy as its 
econometric parameter estimates evolved.  This view 
suggests that no fundamental lesson was learned and that 
high inflation can remerge if parameter estimates drift 
appropriately.   
 
Orphanides (2003) argues that in the 1970s a big 
productivity shock lowered potential output but the Fed 
was slow to recognize the shift.  The big inflation 
occurred while the Fed was substantially overestimating 
the output gap.  Nelson and Nikolov (2001) follow this 
line for the UK. 
 
Here are some of the main ingredients of the paper. 
 
Household utility arguments – consumption, real money 
balances and leisure. 
 
Adjustment costs for capital. 
 
Final goods produced from intermediate goods. 
 
Intermediate goods produced from capital and labour. 
 
Staggered price setting. 
 
Random government spending supported by taxes. 
 
Monetary policy follows a Taylor rule but potential 
output is not observable and the Fed learns about it. 
 
Computational approach moving around parameters of 
various types. 
 
1. Taylor rule parameters. 
 
2. The noise on the signal about potential output. 
 
3. The degree of price flexibility. 
 
They study the response to a negative productivity shock 
of various sizes and the volatility of inflation and output.   
 
 
 
 
What do we learn? 
 
To produce a great inflation you need: 
 
1. a lot of noise on the output gap.  With lots of noise 
it can take a long time after a productivity shock for the 
Fed and the public to realize the degree to which it is 
overestimating potential output.  Agents think actual 
output, which is low, is well below potential output and 
actual inflation, which is high, remains persistently 
above expectations.  This sounds like Orphanides. 
 
2. There has to be a large productivity shock. 
 
With these two elements the model doesn’t generate 
enough variability in inflation and output to reflect what 
happened.  So the authors play around with Taylor rules.  
They find that good correspondence with reality requires: 
 
3. The 1970s Fed has to be sluggish.  Specifically, a 
Post-Volker Taylor rule does generate enough variability 
of any kind. 
 
4. They can do a reasonable job of matching the data 
with a 1970s Fed that is weak on inflation (a coefficient 
of about 1), but not as weak as Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
would have it (.8), and basically indifferent to output (a 
coefficient of about 0).   
 
But such a Taylor seems quite implausible.  It is also 
inconsistent with any story I know of or can think of 
about the 1970s.   
 
Where does this leave us? 
 
I think there’s definite potential here.  It was never going 
to be easy to get the model to look like the 1970s for 
such a wide range of variables but Dellas and Collard 
give it a go. 
 
Overall this work seems to support the notion that the 
1970s Fed was not quite as weak as is commonly thought 
and, therefore, less has changed than meets the eye. 
 
For the mainstream Taylor specifications the variability 
is low on inflation and output but perhaps this isn’t so 
bad.  Stock and Watson (2003) argues that underlying 
shocks were big in the 1970s and moderated around 1984 
so maybe it makes sense simply to increase the variance 
by just taking larger shocks. 
 
